Deep Health Check Report
1. Executive Summary
This report summarizes the security and operational risk posture of the Magento system for [Store Name]. The intent is to replace assumptions with verifiable signals and a prioritized remediation plan.
- MB-C02 β Admin Hardening: Admin URL default and/or 2FA not enforced.
- MB-C09 β Extension Vulnerability Management: 2 shipping modules EOL or flagged by known advisories.
- MB-C07 β Logging & Monitoring: Baseline alerting insufficient for early anomaly detection.
2. Scope & Limitations
- Magento security configuration review (admin, sessions, cron, logging baseline).
- Targeted code/config review using the Magebean 12 Controls Framework. (The Baseline V1).
- Extension/module posture review: versions, EOL status, known advisories (when available).
- Server hardening checklist relevant to Magento runtime and exposure.
- Full penetration testing (manual exploitation end-to-end) and social engineering.
- DDoS testing, performance/load testing.
- Malware cleanup / incident response (unless separately contracted).
Note: Findings represent the system state within the defined scope at the time of assessment. This is not a guarantee of absence of compromise or future vulnerabilities.
3. Status Legend
A red status indicates remediation priority, not confirmed compromise.
4. Baseline 12 Controls Summary
Summary of the 12 control areas and their current status.
| Control ID | Control Area | Status | Expert Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| MB-C01 | File & Folder Permissions | π’ Good | Tight file permissions observed; no obvious world-readable sensitive files. |
| MB-C02 | Admin Hardening | π΄ High Risk | Admin path default and/or 2FA not enforced. |
| MB-C03 | Secure Coding Practices | π‘ Warning | Some custom code paths require validation/sanitization hardening. |
| MB-C07 | Logging & Monitoring | π‘ Warning | Baseline alerting insufficient for early anomaly detection. |
| MB-C09 | Extension Vulnerability Management | π΄ High Risk | 2 shipping modules EOL / flagged by advisories; remediation required. |
| MB-Cxx | [Other Control Area] | π‘ Warning | [Short note] |
5. Hot Findings (Prioritized)
We highlight only the highest-impact items. Detailed checklists and raw rule outputs can be provided upon request.
Admin URL is default and/or 2FA is not enforced for all admin accounts.
Increases likelihood of credential stuffing / brute force leading to admin account takeover.
- Change admin path away from default.
- Enforce 2FA for 100% of admin users.
- Audit admin accounts; disable unused accounts; standardize roles.
- 100% admin accounts have 2FA enabled.
- Admin path is non-default.
- Owner-approved admin account list (audit sign-off).
Two shipping-related modules are EOL (no longer maintained) and/or running versions flagged by known advisories.
Third-party modules are common entry points when patches are not available or not applied.
- Update to a supported safe version (if vendor supports).
- If not possible, replace with a maintained alternative.
- Interim controls: disable unused features + increase monitoring/WAF rules (if applicable).
- Modules updated/replaced and no longer flagged as High Risk.
- Version + update date recorded in change log.
6. Action Plan
A prioritized remediation roadmap with measurable outcomes.
| Priority | Work Item | Outcome | Effort | ETA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | MB-C02 β Admin hardening | Reduce takeover risk via 2FA + non-default admin path | LowβMed | β€ 24h |
| P1 | MB-C09 β Update/replace risky modules | Remove high-risk third-party entry points | Med | β€ 24h |
| P2 | MB-C05 β Server/runtime hardening | Reduce exposure and improve baseline stability | Med | Within 7 days |
| Ongoing | Monthly scan & review | Maintain posture and prevent configuration drift | Low | Monthly |
7. Appendix
8. Sign-off
Disclaimer: This report reflects the system state within the defined scope at the time of assessment and is not a guarantee of absence of compromise or future vulnerabilities.